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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MAVIS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15934

FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION

The nature of the case and disposition in the lower court
are thoroughly discussed in Appellant's initial brief, and will
not be repeated here.

For convenience, reference to the

Respondent's brief will be shown as (R's brief), and the
Transcript of Trial as

(Tr.).
ARGUMENT

~hether Mr.

!1eikle was acting as an agent for defendant

First Colon:' or an independent broker is a question of fact to
be determined by the trier of fact.
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Respondent cites in his brief, Utah Code Annotated
§

31-17-2 (1953), which section provides:
"A 'Broker' is any person who, on behalf
of the insured, for compensation as an
independent contractor, or commission,
or fee, and not being an agent of the
insurer, solicits, negotiates, or procures
insurance or reinsurance or the renewal or
continuance thereof .
(Emphasis added).

Respondent cites this Section to support his position that
Mr. Meikle was in fact a broker at the time of his solicitation
of plaintiff and her husband and not an insurance agent of the
defendant.

Respondent, however, fails to cite Utah Code

Annotated § 31-17-l (1953), which defines an insurance agent
as:
"i'.r~. ;:-p-cc:::n authorized by an insurer
on its behalf to solicit applications for
insurance, to effectuate and countersign
insurance contracts except as to life or
disability insurances, and to collect
premiums or insurances so applied for or
effectuated .

An insurance "broker" as defined, supra, become·

an agent of

an insurance company when he, on behalf of the insurer,
"solicits applications" and "collects premiums".
Appellant's brief as filed herein, clearly establishes
the fact that Mr. Meikle solicited an application of insurance
on behalf of the defendant and with defendant's knowledge and
accepted plaintiff's first premium payment on the insurance
applied for.
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Respondent at page 25 of its brief cites Couch,
Insurance, 2d §§ 25:92 wherein Couch states:
"Whether a person acts as a broker or an
agent is not determined by what he is called
but is to be determined from what he does."
Appellant agrees with this statement, and asserts that the
following facts

support a showing that Mr. Meikle was acting

as an agent of defendant First Colony in his negotiations with
the plaintiff:
1.

Meikle procured from defendant or its agent at least one

application form for insurance with the defendant;
2.

Meikle approached plaintiff and her husband with

defendant's application for insurance;
3.

Meikle suggested to plaintiff and her husband that

they should buy insurance with defendant;
4.

Meikle accepted from plaintiff the first premium payment

for insurance with the defendant;
5.

Meikle executed the receipt delivered to Mrs. Williams

as agent for the defendant and specifically presented himself as
agent of defendant on the receipt.
6.

Meikle dealt directly with the defendant in the

transmittal of said premium payment.
·
th e case of Barnett v. State Automobile
Respondent cltes
and casua~ty underwriters, 26 U.2d 169, P.2d 311 (1971) to support
·
t adheres to the rule that negotiations
his assertion that thls Cour
between an insurance salesman and a person seeking insurance
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coverage create an agency relationship between the two if the
salesman is not bound to place the insurance in a company which
he normally represents.

However, such an assertion is not

supported by the Barnett case.

In Barnett, the court held that:

"where a soliciting agent promises a customer
that he will notify him before the contract of
insurance exrires, or where, as in this case,
he permits a custom or usage to arise which requires him to give the insuran8~ notice of the
expiration date, he is acting as the agent of
the insured and not the insurer, since such an
agent may place the next term of insurance
with another company if he cares to do so."
Such a holding does not apply to the creation of an insurance
contact by an agent authorized to solicit insurance on behalf
of the insurance company.
Contrary to respondent's claims, the cases cited in
Appellant's brlef do support the proposition that Meikle was,
in fact, an agent of defendant First Colony.

In Imperial Casu-

alty & Indemnity Company v. Carolina Gas Insurance Company,
402 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968), the Iowa court held that under
Iowa law:
"any person soliciting insurance or procuring
an application therefor shall be held to be the
soliciting agent of the insurance company."
In Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
405 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that a soliciting agent, even though
he's not a general agent of the insurance company,

is an aoent

of the insurance company up to and including the consummation
of the insurance agreement.
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Houston

Fire & Casualty Co. v. Jones, 315 F.2d 116

(lOth Cir. 1963)

stands for the proposition that although a

salesman of the insurer's policy-writing agent had no specific
contractual relationship with the insurer, the salesman,
nevertheless, had implied authority to act as soliciting agent
for the insurer and to bind the insurer by an insurance binder,
when the salesman used approaches and forms sup?lied him by the
insurer to sell insurance.

The facts in the Houston Fire case

are very similar to the facts of this case.

Mr. Meikle was

supplied forms by the defendant for the purpose of soliciting
insurance for and on behalf of the defendant.
Perhaps the most significant case cited by

Appe~lant's

brief is the case of Ferrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance
~,

120 Utah 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1950).

While Respondent gues

to great length to distinguish the Ferrington case from this
case, he fails to recognize the fact that the first question
to be determined in this case is whether Mr. Meikle was in fact
acting as a broker or an agent of the defendant when he
approached plaintiff and plaintiff's husband with defendant's
application for insurance.

In the Ferrington case this court

addressed itself to that very question, wher the court stated:
"Defendants insist . . . throughout their
brief that in connection with the ~lacement
of this insurance that Bowman was 1n f~ct
the agent for the plaintiff, w7 deem lt
.
unnecessary to set forth a deta1led analys1s
of the various sections of the code because
it was enacted primarily for the purpose of
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regulating insurance companies, agents,
brokers, solicitors and adjustors.
It was
not intended to change or control the ordinary rules of agency between insurance
companies and the public with whom they deal.
If Bowman's conduct was in fact that of an
agent for defendants, the licensing and regulatory provisions of the statute would not
change that relationship so far as the plaintiff was concerned."
Clearly, this case stands for the proposition that whether
Meikle was an agent of the defendant is a question of fact
to be determined by the actions of Mr. Meikle and the defendant
insurance company and not by the provisions of the Utah code
cited by the Respondent.
Based upon the facts of this case and the authorities
as cited herein and in Appellant's brief, the trier of fact
could easily find that Meikle was an agent of the defendant
First Colony.

Inasmuch as there is a reasonable basis upon

which a trier of fact could determine that fact,

this Court

should reverse the district court's granting of Summary Judgment
and remand this case to the district court for trial upon the
merits.
Respectfully submitted this

~~day

of February,

1979.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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